

THE LOGISTICS PARADIGM IN RETROSPECT: A LITERATURE REVIEW OVER TIME

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Gustavo Henrique Feddersen¹

Igor Estima Sardo²

Abstract

This article aims to analyze the theoretical discussion about the Brazilian Logistics paradigm proposed by Amado Cervo in the literature on International Relations, and Brazilian foreign policy, since the research question is whether the theoretical construct of the Logistics Paradigm was influenced by domestic events from 1999 to 2012. The answer to the previous question, that is, the hypothesis, is that the academic debate on such a construct, the Logistics Paradigm, was influenced by the events of the diplomatic offensive that Brazil went through in the first two terms of President Lula. The article uses a review of selected works to address the paradigmatic periodization elaborated by Amado Cervo, and to analyze the beginning and end of the Logistics Paradigm in the academic literature. It is concluded that, in fact, the debate about the paradigm suffered oscillations, going from optimism to skepticism as a result of the end of such a diplomatic offensive.

Keywords: Foreign policy. Diplomacy. South-South Relations.

1 Associate Professor in the International Relations Undergraduate Program, Federal University of Rio Grande. Santa Vitória do Palmar, Brazil. E-mail: gustavo.feddersen@gmail.com.

2 Graduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. Porto Alegre, Brasil. E-mail: igorsardo@gmail.com.

O PARADIGMA LOGÍSTICO EM RETROSPECTO: UMA REVISÃO DE LITERATURA AO LONGO DO TEMPO

Resumo

O presente artigo tem por objetivo analisar a discussão teórica acerca do paradigma Logístico brasileiro proposto por Amado Cervo na literatura de Relações Internacionais e política externa brasileira, uma vez que se põe como pergunta de pesquisa se o constructo teórico do paradigma Logístico sofreu influência dos acontecimentos domésticos de 1999 a 2012. A resposta à indagação anterior, ou seja, a hipótese, é que o debate acadêmico de tal constructo, o paradigma Logístico, sofreu influência dos acontecimentos da ofensiva diplomática que o Brasil passou nos dois mandatos iniciais do presidente Lula. O artigo se utiliza de revisão de trabalhos selecionados para abordar a periodização paradigmática elaborada por Amado Cervo e analisar o início e fim do Paradigma Logístico na literatura acadêmica. Conclui-se que, de fato, o debate acerca do paradigma sofreu de oscilações, indo do otimismo ao ceticismo em decorrência do fim de tal ofensiva diplomática.

Palavras-chave: Política Externa. Diplomacia. Relações Sul-Sul.

EL PARADIGMA DE LA LOGÍSTICA EN RETROSPECTIVA: UNA REVISIÓN DE LA LITERATURA A LO LARGO DEL TIEMPO

Resumen

Este artículo tiene como objetivo analizar la discusión teórica sobre el paradigma de la Logística brasileña propuesto por Amado Cervo en la literatura sobre relaciones internacionales y política exterior brasileña, ya que plantea como pregunta de investigación si el constructo teórico del paradigma de la Logística fue influenciado por acontecimientos internos de 1999 a 2012. La respuesta a la pregunta anterior, es decir, la hipótesis, es que el debate académico sobre tal constructo, el Paradigma de la Logística, fue influenciado por los acontecimientos de la ofensiva diplomática que Brasil vivió en los dos mandatos iniciales del presidente Lula. El artículo utiliza una revisión de obras seleccionadas para abordar la periodización paradigmática elaborada por Amado Cervo y analizar el inicio y el fin del paradigma de la Logística en la literatura académica. Se concluye que, efectivamente, el debate sobre el paradigma sufrió oscilaciones, pasando del optimismo al escepticismo a raíz del fin de tal ofensiva diplomática.

Palabras clave: Política exterior. Diplomacia. Relaciones Sur-Sur.

1. Introduction

The history of Brazilian foreign policy has been a topic of debate in Brazilian academia since the beginning of the formation of International Relations (IR) courses in Brazil (Casarões 2018; Milani 2021; Santos 2005). Like any other historical process, it is necessary to analyze it using a method (Braudel 1983; Gustavsson 1999; Hermann 1990; Hudson 1995; Sennes 2003). One of these methods, in this sense, is the paradigmatic periodization of Amado Cervo (2008), a historian of IR, who consecrated a periodization based on historical paradigms of Brazil's development, making a connection between Political Economy, and foreign policy. At the beginning of the 21st century, he was one of the main proponents of a new paradigm in Brazil's diplomatic history, that is, the Logistics Paradigm (Cervo 2008; Cervo and Bueno 2008). This proposition was due to a series of changes in the orientation of Brazilian diplomacy from the 2000s onwards, in the beginning of the Luís Inácio Lula da Silva government (2003–2010).

Brazilian academia quickly reacted to the new analysis, given Amado Cervo's notable output in the area of IR in Brazil, with comments ranging from enthusiasm for the analysis to skepticism regarding the conclusions. Both the proposal for the new paradigm and the academic debate were formed at a time when Brazilian foreign policy, during the Lula administration, was experiencing a "diplomatic offensive" (Silva 2015, 144, authors' translation),³ which may have compromised the views and analyses about this period with a certain presumption and feeling of presentism, that is, the feeling that what is happening in the present is unprecedented and grandiose.

Therefore, this article investigates whether the theoretical construct of the Logistics Paradigm was influenced by domestic events from 1999 to 2012. The choice of this period is due to Cervo's own work (2008) placing it as the period of the Logistics Paradigm. To support the previous thesis, the hypothesis is that the academic debate on this construct, the Logistics Paradigm, was influenced by the events of the diplomatic offensive that Brazil underwent during the first two terms of President Lula.

To test the hypothesis, a literature review and qualitative analysis will be conducted on selected works that analyze the Logistics Paradigm, both within the period of analysis (1999–2012) and beyond the period, in order to trace the evolution of the theme:⁴

3 In the original: "ofensiva diplomática" (Silva 2015, 144).

4 The presentation of the works was placed in chronological order, considering the themes of each one.

- a) *Do otimismo liberal à globalização assimétrica: a política externa do governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002)* (Silva 2008);
- b) *A busca de um novo paradigma: política exterior, comércio externo e federalismo no Brasil* (Saraiva 2004);
- c) *Desenvolvimento Nacional e Integração Regional: O BNDES como Instrumento de Política Externa no Governo Lula da Silva (2003–2010)* (Freixo and Ristoff 2012);
- d) *Política Externa, política de defesa e modelo de desenvolvimento no Brasil: do Estado desenvolvimentista ao Estado Logístico (1930–2017)* (Martins and Nunes 2017);
- e) *Política externa e desenvolvimento econômico no Brasil: história e paradigmas (1930–2016)* (Moraes 2019);
- f) *A política externa do governo Dilma Rousseff para a América do Sul (2011–2016): o fim do paradigma Logístico?* (Jaeger 2016).

These works for analysis—a doctoral thesis (Silva 2008), a master’s dissertation (Jaeger 2016) and four articles (Freixo and Ristoff 2012; Jaeger 2016; Martins and Nunes 2017; Moraes 2019; Saraiva 2004)—were selected using four academic search engines: CAPES Journal, SciElo, Scopus, and Google Scholar, until January 2025, using the keywords “Logistics Paradigm” and “Logistics State”. The objective of this research, therefore, is to analyze the theoretical discussion about the Brazilian Logistics Paradigm proposed by Amado Cervo in the literature on IR and Brazilian foreign policy. Finally, the purpose of this research is justified by the need to analyze academic terms in retrospect, in addition to not finding similar work in the same search engines used to conduct the research.

2. Amado Cervo’s paradigmatic periodization and the essay on the logistics paradigm

Amado Cervo (2008) divides the history of Brazilian diplomacy into four periods, using paradigmatic separation as a method: the liberal-conservative paradigm (1822–1930), the developmentalist paradigm (1930–1989), the neoliberal paradigm (1990–1999), and the logistics paradigm (2000–2010). For Cervo (2008), “[...] the paradigm includes the perception of interests. The interpretation that leaders make of national interests—social, political, security, economic, cultural—changes with the paradigm shift” (Cervo 2008, 65,

authors' translation).⁵ It is interesting to note that Cervo identifies the rise of a new ruling elite as a paradigm shift in Brazilian history, making it possible to draw a parallel between paradigmatic ruptures and the works of elite theorists, such as Wright Mills (1962). Thus, for Cervo there is an intrinsic relationship between development—the fields of economics and sociology—and foreign policy (Cervo and Bueno, 2008).

This association is clear, for example, in his analyses of the liberal-conservative paradigm, in which, for over 100 years, an agro-exporting ruling class dominated the agendas of Brazilian diplomacy:

Brazilian liberal-conservatives proceeded to interpret the national interest, evoking a concept of a simple society [...] Those leaders unsurprisingly confused the national interest with their own, that is, those of the hegemonic socioeconomic group: securing labor, exporting agricultural products and importing diversified consumer goods (Cervo 2008, 70, authors' translation).⁶

Something to note in Cervo's paradigm model is that it is a long-term variable, that is, the paradigm describes a trend within a long period, which means that short-term variations are allowed. A fruitful parallel can be drawn with the theoretical contributions of Fernand Braudel (1983) to the field of History. For Braudel (1983), there are multiple temporalities in the study of history, with long-term trend events occurring *pari passu* with short—and medium—term trend events. In this sense, even though the liberal-conservative paradigm is a long period of analysis, there are short-term events that deviate from the long-term trend. For Cervo, the liberal face dominated much of the paradigm, but “[t]he conservative side explains the failed industrialization project of the 1840s, the determination to exercise a certain control over the Platine subsystem of International Relations, and the firm negotiation of the borders of the national territory” (Cervo 2008, 70, authors' translation).⁷

5 In the original: “[...] o paradigma inclui a percepção de interesses. A leitura que os dirigentes fazem dos interesses nacionais – sociais, políticos, de segurança, econômicos, culturais – modificam-se com a mudança de paradigma” (Cervo 2008, 65).

6 In the original: “Os liberais-conservadores brasileiros procediam à leitura do interesse nacional, evocando um conceito de sociedade simples, [...] Aqueles dirigentes confundiam, logicamente, o interesse nacional com os próprios interesses, ou seja, os do grupo socioeconômico hegemônico: dispor de mão-de-obra, exportar os frutos da lavoura e importar bens de consumo diversificados” (Cervo 2008, 70).

7 In the original: “[a] face conservadora explica o malogrado projeto de industrialização dos anos 1840, a determinação de exercer um certo controle sobre o subsistema platino de relações internacionais e a negociação firme das fronteiras do território nacional” (Cervo 2008, 70).

The liberal-conservative paradigm only came to an end with a paradigmatic rupture that also required a rupture among the national elites, that is, the 1930 Revolution ended the previous paradigm and gave rise to the developmentalist paradigm. The 1930 Revolution represented the peak of the tenentist movement in Brazil, a movement of middle-ranking officers who saw regional oligarchies as a threat to national integrity, and the state as a tool for national transformation. The Brazilian Army, after the modernization that occurred in the Paraguayan War, became an influential political actor and often interfered in national politics (Silva and Svartman 2014). In this sense, the army and the new urban bourgeoisie promoted modernization and national integration through industrialization and the import substitution process from the Vargas governments to the José Sarney government, whether with the national private sector, the international private sector or the state sector (Cervo 2008; Cervo and Bueno 2008).

In the developmentalist paradigm, as in the previous paradigm, there was a long-term tendency for foreign policy to be oriented autonomously and independently in search of development on a national basis. However, as in the previous example, there were short-term oscillations, such as in the governments of Marechal Dutra (1946–1951), João Café Filho (1954–1955) and Marechal Castello Branco (1964–1967), in which Brazilian diplomacy once again took a dependentist and retractionist turn (Cervo 2008; Cervo and Bueno 2008). It is important to note that the ruling class of the developmentalist paradigm did not come from civil society, but from the state itself: that is, from army officers and government bureaucrats who took over the reins of development, allying themselves both with a nascent national bourgeoisie and with dependent-associated foreign capital (Cardoso and Faletto 2004).

From the 1980s onwards, the Brazilian state began to suffer a series of external shocks—the Second Oil Shock, rising dollar interest rates, the debt crisis, hyperinflation, and stagnation—which led to the exhaustion of the developmentalist paradigm and the withdrawal of the military and the industrial bourgeoisie from the political scene. Once the army returned power to civilians, a vacuum in the ruling class was quickly filled by the urban bourgeoisie that was formed in the 20th century, a business class composed of national capital and dependent-associated capital. Thus, after the election of Fernando Collor de Mello as president in 1990, the developmentalist paradigm was supplanted by the neoliberal paradigm, which sought to adjust the macroeconomic imbalances that Brazil was experiencing through structural shock therapy. To this end, the paradigm relied on commercial and financial openness, rapprochement with the United States (US) and participation of

international regimes that reaffirmed American hegemony in the post-Cold War period (Cervo 2008; Cervo and Bueno 2008).

In this sense, the neoliberal paradigm, also known as normal, is divided into two moments: the Collor government (1990–1992) and the Cardoso era (1992–2002),⁸ and Cervo summarizes it as:

Normal leaders immediately sterilize two key ideas of the developmentalist paradigm: the ideas of national interest and national development project. [...] In the world of Globalization, those leaders understood that national interests are diluted in the order woven by the multilateral arrangement of International Relations and by the systemic course of the forces of capitalism, the so-called *global governance* (Cervo 2008, 80, authors' translation).⁹

However, what is curious when analyzing Cervo's normal paradigm is its extension when compared to the others. In this sense, Cervo even argues that, in fact, the normal paradigm itself may have been an interregnum of paradigms, since the Cardoso era was surrounded by paradigmatic contradictions, something that Cervo called the dance of paradigms:

[...] while Cardoso's Brazil shows hesitation regarding the pace and coherence to adopt in light of the new model of international insertion and internal organization. Paradigmatic coexistence, although it may seem paradoxical to the analyst, characterizes the Cardoso era, especially because the man who presides over it reveals theoretical inconsistencies and operational hesitations as traits of his personality. Cardoso offers, in effect, the spectacle of the dance of paradigms: the developmentalist paradigm that he takes pleasure in seriously wounding without killing, the normal paradigm that emerges in a prevailing way and the Logistical Paradigm that is being tested as another path (Cervo 2008, 82, authors' translation).¹⁰

8 Although the period under analysis includes the brief government of Itamar Franco, Cervo considers the decade as Cardoso's era (Cervo 2008, 79).

9 In the original: "Os dirigentes normais esterilizam, de pronto, duas ideias-chave do paradigma desenvolvimentista: as ideias de interesse nacional e de projeto nacional de desenvolvimento. [...] No mundo da Globalização, entendiam aqueles dirigentes, interesses nacionais se diluem na ordem tecida pelo ordenamento multilateral das relações internacionais e pelo curso sistêmico das forças do capitalismo, a chamada *governança global*" (Cervo 2008, 80).

10 In the original: "[...] enquanto o Brasil de Cardoso manifesta hesitações quanto ao ritmo e à coerência a adotar diante do novo modelo de inserção internacional e organização interna. A coexistência paradigmática, embora pareça paradoxal ao analista, caracteriza a era Cardoso, mesmo porque o homem que a preside revela

In this excerpt, Cervo introduces the notion of the Logistics Paradigm as an essay on what Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's two terms in office (2003–2010) were like, that is, a dialectical synthesis between the two previous paradigms. At this point in the analysis, it is already possible to perceive the prominent light that Amado Cervo places on the figure of the state as an inducer of development, a fact that raises criticism upon his work. Not surprisingly, Cervo does not hide his disdain for the normal paradigm:

At the end of the 20th century, however, after the developmentalist phase, the same rules established by the hegemonic structures of capitalism were once again accepted, passively, as in the previous century. The two years, 1930 and 1990, became symbols of a paradigmatic rupture in Brazil's International Relations, in a countermovement (Cervo 2008, 76, authors' translation).¹¹

Regarding this perception, Paulo Roberto de Almeida (1993, 30–31, authors' translation)¹² criticizes him:

A single problem raises this synthesis [...]. He [Cervo] refers to a question of a strictly methodological order, namely, the monitoring of foreign policy according to the Hegelian vision, [...] following the unfolding of History according to a guiding idea, not necessarily preconceived, but unmistakably conceived *a posteriori*, in this case, the incessant search for economic development and the role of the state in this process [...].

In this sense, an initial critique arises of Cervo's (2008) concept of paradigm, as it possibly carries a preconceived guiding idea. Far from being a serious methodological flaw, the concept is still extremely powerful in its explanatory nature. However, it opens flanks for methodological attack, as

incoerências teóricas e hesitações operacionais como traços de sua personalidade. Cardoso oferece, com efeito, o espetáculo da dança dos paradigmas: o desenvolvimentista que ele se compraz em ferir gravemente sem matar, o normal que emerge de forma prevalecente e o Logístico que se ensaia como outra via (Cervo 2008, 82).

11 In the original: "Ao termo do século XX, entretanto, após a fase desenvolvimentista, as mesmas regras fixadas pelas estruturas hegemônicas do capitalismo voltaram a ser aceitas, de modo passivo, como no século anterior. Os dois anos, 1930 e 1990, arvoram-se símbolos de ruptura paradigmática das relações internacionais do Brasil, em movimento contrário" (Cervo 2008, 76).

12 In the original: "Um único problema suscita essa síntese [...]. Ele [Cervo] se refere a uma questão de ordem propriamente metodológica, a saber, o monitoramento da política exterior segundo a visão hegeliana, [...] acompanhando o desenrolar da História segundo uma ideia-guia, não necessariamente preconcebida, mas indistintamente concebida a posteriori, no caso, a busca incessante do desenvolvimento econômico e o papel do Estado nesse processo [...]" (Almeida 1993, 30–31).

will be seen below. Such gaps led other authors to work with periodizations that compete with Cervo's.

Ricardo Sennes (2003), for example, works with the concept of foreign policy matrix, encompassing long-term trends in shorter and more restricted periods; Charles Hermann (1990) works with the notion of degrees of change in foreign policy, with changes, on an increasing scale, of (i) program, (ii) objective, and (iii) orientation; Martins and Nunes (2017) use the notion of type of state, restricted to even shorter periods of analysis, as in this case, from 1999 to 2012. As can be seen, when it comes to History, the periodization method is never closed to revisions and contributions.

3. The Logistics Paradigm: from 1999 to 2012

Finally, Cervo introduces the concept of the Logistics Paradigm as a synthesis of the previous paradigms, given that “[t]he ideology underlying the Logistics State paradigm associates an external element, liberalism, with an internal element, developmentalism. It merges the classical doctrine of capitalism with Latin American structuralism” (Cervo 2008, 85, authors’ translation).¹³ Thus, the Logistics Paradigm came from the idea of outsourcing old state functions of the developmentalist paradigm to civil society, such as growth, but without neglecting the role of the state in promoting national autonomy. Therefore, this paradigm “[keeps] legacies of neoliberalism, such as fiscal responsibility, monetary stability, incentives for foreign investment, and opening up markets” (Cervo 2008, 83, authors’ translation),¹⁴ but with greater guidance and direction from the Ministries of Finance, Planning, Industry, Commerce etc. (Cervo and Bueno 2008; Cervo 2008).

Now, what concerns the question of this work is how the debate about the Logistics Paradigm took place in the period from 1999 to 2012. In this regard, the academic debate gained depth, with Cervo arguing that “[t]he introduction of the Logistics Paradigm during the Cardoso era was no more than a trial” (Cervo 2008, 83, authors’ translation),¹⁵ even though the “dance of paradigms” occurred during the Cardoso administration (Cervo 2008, 82,

13 In the original: “[a] ideologia subjacente ao paradigma do Estado Logístico associa um elemento externo, o liberalismo, ao outro interno, o desenvolvimentismo. Funde a doutrina clássica do capitalismo com o estruturalismo latino-americano” (Cervo 2008, 85).

14 In the original: “[guarda] heranças do neoliberalismo, como responsabilidade fiscal, estabilidade monetária, estímulos aos investimentos estrangeiros e abertura de mercados” (Cervo 2008, 83).

15 In the original: “[a] introdução do Paradigma Logístico durante a era Cardoso não foi além de um ensaio” (Cervo 2008, 83).

authors' translation).¹⁶ In this regard, André Luiz Reis da Silva (2008) agrees with Cervo, in part, when he writes that the paradox of more than one paradigm coexisting at the same time in Brazilian foreign policy led to the agony of the decision-making process and the developmentalist state, igniting the normal state and the rehearsal of the Logistics state, since "the blame for the difficulties of foreign policy lies precisely in experiencing a democratic regime, which would make its definition difficult, being in permanent reorientation" (Silva 2008, 147, authors' translation).¹⁷

For Silva (2008, 148, authors' translation),¹⁸ this occurs because "adherence to neoliberalism was not complete, demonstrating the persistence (acknowledged by Amado Cervo) of the developmentalist paradigm." Furthermore, a central theme of his work, Silva (2008) argues that neoliberalism in Brazil brought setbacks that were quickly reversed by the Brazilian state, both in the sphere of political decision-making and in foreign policy discourse. This shift from neoliberal optimism to the discourse of asymmetric globalization was, above all, due to the exchange rate crisis of January 1999 that Brazilian Real went through. No longer able to sustain the exchange rate band regime, the Brazilian Real suffered a strong devaluation due to intense capital flight. Frustrated with his dependent-associated development plan, Cardoso began to advocate in favor of controls on the movement of international capital and against asymmetric globalization (Silva 2008). Going further, José Miguel Quedi Martins and Raul Cavedon Nunes (2017 204, authors' translation)¹⁹ argue along the same line, considering that "[the] transition from the strategy of autonomy through integration to 'autonomy through assertiveness' had already begun in the 2nd FHC government, but [was] consolidated in the Lula government, from 2002 onwards."

In this sense, Silva (2008) and Cervo (2008) point out that the Logistics Paradigm had its embryo as early as 1999 during the Cardoso administration. For Silva (2008), commenting on Cervo (2008), the setbacks in foreign policy forced the Cardoso government to evolve from subservience to a more realistic foreign trade policy, seeking to export more than import in order to

16 In the original: "dança dos paradigmas" (Cervo 2008, 82).

17 In the original: "a culpa das dificuldades da política externa está justamente em estar vivenciando um regime democrático, o que dificultaria sua definição, estando em permanente reorientação" (Silva 2008, 147).

18 In the original: "a adesão ao neoliberalismo não foi integral, mostrando a persistência (admitida por Amado Cervo) do paradigma desenvolvimentista" Silva (2008, 148).

19 In the original: "[a] transição da estratégia da autonomia pela integração para a 'autonomia pela assertividade' começou já no 2º governo FHC, mas [foi] consolidada no Governo Lula, a partir de 2002" (Martins and Nunes 2017, 204).

overcome the problems in the Balance of Payments, one of the characteristics of the Logistics Paradigm. From the point of view of the perception of IR, the Logistics State seems well defined even under Cardoso, but from the point of view of external action, this program gained more substance from 2003 onwards, with the beginning of the Lula government (Cervo 2008).

For José Flávio Sombra Saraiva (2004, 140, authors' translation)²⁰ “[t]he concept of the Logistics State presupposes overcoming both the model of unbridled liberal insertion and the nationalist developmentalism of the past.” In this regard, there are two elements that make up the Logistics State for Saraiva: “[...] on the one hand, it advocates the construction of the means of power and, on the other, its use to assert comparative advantages of an intangible nature, such as science, technology, and entrepreneurial capacity” (2004, 140–141, authors' translation).²¹ For Isaías Albertin de Moraes (2019), the Logistics Paradigm recovered developmentalism under a new guise: new developmentalism. This is characterized by:

[...] i) promotion of national development; ii) overcoming external vulnerability through trade surpluses; iii) foreign trade as a stimulus to domestic production and not only for price control and monetary stability; iv) promotion of the multipolar world order in a realistic and pragmatic way; v) South-South axis as a priority, without excluding the importance of the North-South axis; vi) strong regionalism and bilateral activism; vii) the principle of non-indifference is as important as the principle of non-intervention; viii) autonomy through diversification, search for new partnerships and economic-political spaces (Moraes 2019, 132, authors' translation).²²

Since the economic face of the Logistics State is the new developmentalism, the face of foreign policy was revealed as a diplomatic offensive with three axes:

20 In the original: “[o] conceito de Estado Logístico supõe a superação tanto do modelo de inserção liberal desenfreada quanto do desenvolvimentismo nacionalista de antes” (Saraiva 2004, 140).

21 In the original: “[...] por um lado, advoga-se a construção dos meios de poder e, por outro, sua utilização para fazer valer vantagens comparativas de natureza intangível, como a ciência, a tecnologia e a capacidade empresarial” (Saraiva 2004, 140–141).

22 In the original: “[...] i) promoção do desenvolvimento nacional; ii) superação da vulnerabilidade externa por meio de superávits comerciais; iii) comércio exterior como estímulo à produção interna e não somente para controle de preços e estabilidade monetária; iv) promoção da ordem mundial multipolar de forma realista e pragmática; v) eixo Sul-Sul como prioritário, sem excluir a importância do eixo Norte-Sul; vi) forte regionalismo e ativismo bilateral; vii) o princípio de não indiferença é tão importante quanto o princípio de não-intervenção; viii) autonomia pela diversificação, busca de novas parcerias e espaços econômico-políticos” (Moraes 2019, 132).

[...] i) abandoning the illusion of a multilateral and harmonious world advocated by the neoliberal paradigm; ii) rescuing the realistic and practical vision of the independence supporters; iii) seeking to structure a multilateralism of reciprocity between central and peripheral countries. In the economic issue, the Logistics State operates in two ways: i) by aggregating national enterprises to international production chains; ii) by direct investments abroad, initially in neighboring countries (Moraes 2019, 133, authors' translation).²³

At the intersection of these two faces—the economic and the diplomatic—there is a project to promote large Brazilian companies to internationalize and conquer foreign markets, the so-called National Champions. To this end, the Lula government made extensive use of the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES, in Portuguese) as a foreign policy instrument, promoting Brazilian companies worldwide, especially in South America (Freixo and Ristoff 2012). For Freixo and Ristoff (2012), and Bruna Jaeger (2016), the promotion of national companies in South America had a clear strategy of regional integration, under Brazilian leadership, replacing open regionalism with increasing integration. In the words of Jaeger (2016, 44, authors' translation),²⁴ “[a]long the logistics paradigm observed in the Lula da Silva government, major strategic projects for regional development were agreed upon.” In the wake of promoting the internationalization of companies, the Logistics Paradigm period also included industrial policies to encourage productivity gains, such as the Industrial, Technological and Foreign Trade Policy (PITCE, in Portuguese), of 2003, and the Productive Development Policy (PDP), of 2004. Both policies were strongly inspired by neo-Schumpeterian principles to promote Brazilian companies into strong international competitors (Freixo and Ristoff 2012).

Finally, one last aspect worthy of note is the Logistics State's quest for autonomy and assertiveness, y increasing military capabilities. In 2008, the National Defense Strategy was announced, which rethought Brazil's

23 In the original: “[...] i) abandono da ilusão de mundo multilateral e harmonioso preconizados pelo paradigma neoliberal; ii) resgate da visão realista e prática dos independentistas; iii) busca da estruturação de um multilateralismo de reciprocidade entre países centrais e periféricos. Na questão econômica, o Estado Logístico opera de dois modos: i) pela agregação dos empreendimentos nacionais às cadeias produtivas internacionais; ii) por investimentos diretos no exterior, inicialmente nos países vizinhos” (Moraes 2019, 133).

24 In the original: “[a]o longo do Paradigma Logístico observado no governo Lula da Silva, grandes obras de cunho estratégico para o desenvolvimento regional foram acordadas” (Jaeger 2016, 44).

international insertion and preparation for national protection. In the same year, talks began for the acquisition of fourth-and-a-half generation fighter jets (Gripen) from Sweden. Furthermore, previously announced objectives were formalized in 2012 in the National Defense White Paper, such as the doubling of the navy fleet, the commissioning of a nuclear submarine, the ASTROS 2020 Anti-Aircraft Defense Project, the acquisition of a new fleet of armored vehicles, the construction and launch of a geostationary satellite, new rockets, etc. (Martins; Nunes, 2017). Regarding the Logistics State's role in building new capabilities:

[...] the Logistics State once again sought to acquire productive and military capabilities of the 3rd Industrial Revolution. It can be said that the Logistics State sought to synthesize the demands of autonomy (Developmentalist State) and modernization (Liberal State) through the attraction of infrastructure companies to the defense industry and the formation of south-south, south-east and south-north partnerships (Martins and Nunes 2017, 193, authors' translation).²⁵

Therefore, the many facets of the logistics state are evident, and it is difficult to summarize them in a few words. At the time of the presentation, it was clear that the Logistics Paradigm had its embryo in 1999, and its full development during the first decade of the 21st century, especially during the Lula administrations (2003–2010). However, what is still a matter of debate is when, and if, the Logistics Paradigm came to an end.

4. The logistics paradigm: decline or retreat?

Setting an end date for any historical process is an arbitrary attitude, however deeply founded. In this regard, there is a relative consensus that the Logistics Paradigm ended, or at least withdrew, in the middle of the second decade of the 20th century (Cervo and Lessa 2014; Moraes 2019; Jaeger 2016; Martins and Nunes 2017). However, two questions are valid: until what point did the Logistics Paradigm last and whether the Logistics Paradigm had continuity

25 In the original: [...] o Estado Logístico, voltou a buscar adquirir capacidades produtivas e militares da 3ª Revolução Industrial. Pode-se dizer que o Estado Logístico buscou sintetizar as demandas de autonomia (Estado Desenvolvimentista) e de modernização (Estado Liberal) por meio da atração de empresas de infraestrutura para a indústria de defesa e a formação de parcerias sul-sul, sul-leste e sul-norte (Martins and Nunes 2017, 193).

after the diplomatic offensive of the Lula government. For Jaeger (2016), although there was continuity of the Logistics State between the Lula (2003–2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016) administrations, from 2013 onwards, there were already seeds of contraction of the diplomatic offensive. Analyzing from the perspective of regional integration, Jaeger argues that:

[...] it is notable that expectations regarding Brazil's role as an inducer of physical integration were not confirmed. The internal bottlenecks of the Brazilian economy, combined with pressure from conservative groups, have made the effectiveness of these actions quite slow and limited since the Lula period and many projects have not been carried out (Jaeger 2016, 47, authors' translation).²⁶


This is clear in two symptomatic aspects: reduction of regional travel and investments in infrastructure in South America. For Jaeger, “[Based on] the indicator of presidential trips, one can see a retreat and decrease in Rousseff’s external and regional profile compared to Lula” (Jaeger 2016, 39, authors’ translation),²⁷ and, furthermore, “[w]hile in the second Lula government there was a 50% increase in the IIRSA [Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America] project portfolio compared to the first term, in the Dilma government there was an increase of only 9% compared to the previous government” (Jaeger 2016, 46, authors’ translation).²⁸

26 In the original: “[...] é notável que a expectativa em relação ao papel do Brasil como indutor da integração física não se confirmou. Os gargalos internos da economia brasileira, somados às pressões dos grupos conservadores, tornaram a efetividade dessas ações bastante lentas e limitadas desde o período Lula e muitos projetos não foram levados adiante (Jaeger 2016, 47).

27 In the original: “[t]endo como base o indicador das viagens presidenciais, percebe-se um recuo e diminuição no perfil externo e regional de Rousseff em comparação a Lula” (Jaeger 2016, 39).

28 In the original: “[e]nquanto no segundo governo Lula houve um aumento de 50% na carteira de projetos da IIRSA [Iniciativa para a Integração da Infraestrutura Regional Sul-Americana] em relação ao primeiro mandato, no governo Dilma houve um aumento de apenas 9%, comparativamente ao governo anterior” (Jaeger 2016, 46).


Chart 1. Official International Trips by the Presidency of the Republic (2003–2007; 2011–2015)



Source: Jaeger (2016, 36).

Chart 1 clearly shows that the diplomatic offensive began at the end of the Cardoso administration was withdrawn during the first term of the Rousseff administration. The picture becomes even clearer when comparing, in Chart 2, trips to South American countries, strategic partnerships to Brazil.

Chart 2. Presidential Trips to South American Countries (2003–2007; 2011–2015)



Source: Jaeger (2016, 38).

On the other hand, from the perspective of Amado Cervo and Carlos Lessa (2014, 134), the “efficiency of the Logistics Paradigm” was hampered during the Rousseff administration, without making it very clear when this process of decline began. Although the authors mention the internal crisis of “June-July 2013” (Cervo and Lessa 2014, 136), they seem to consider Rousseff’s government as a constant decline. As stated in their words:

After a period of ascension of the country as an emerging power, Brazil’s international insertion began to decline between 2011 and 2014. The causes that determined the change and the new trend are located in the weakening of the dialogue between the state and dynamic segments of society; in the loss of confidence of national and foreign investors and businesspeople in the government; in the weakening of strategies and the lack of new ideas capable of motivating external agents; in the stagnation of public management with the loss of the state’s capacity to induce; finally, in the protagonism of Russia and China within the BRICS (Cervo and Lessa 2014, 149, authors’ translation).²⁹

For both, the causes of the decline in foreign policy after the Lula government are found in the domestic domain. However, the authors still recognize that the Logistics Paradigm is present in two sectors during this period from 2011 to 2014: “agribusiness and the expansion of Brazilian companies abroad, that is, economic internationalization. In the sphere of humanitarian multilateralism and international security, principles and conduct remain the same” (Cervo and Lessa 2014, 150, authors’ translation).³⁰

For Moraes (2019) and Martins and Nunes (2017), the Logistics State had clear developments after the Lula da Silva administration. Moraes (2019) does not explicitly state the causes of the end of the Logistics Paradigm, but points out that it ended in 2016 (Moraes 2019, 136). Meanwhile, Martins and Nunes argue that the crisis of the Logistics State occurred in stages, since

²⁹ In the original: “Após uma fase de ascensão do país como potência emergente, a inserção internacional do Brasil entra em declínio entre 2011 e 2014. As causas que determinam a mudança e a nova tendência localizam-se no enfraquecimento do diálogo entre Estado e segmentos dinâmicos da sociedade; na quebra da confiança de investidores e empresários nacionais e estrangeiros no governo; no enfraquecimento de estratégias e inexistência de ideias novas capazes de motivar agentes externos; no emperramento da gestão pública com perda da capacidade indutora do Estado; enfim, no protagonismo de Rússia e China no seio do Brics” (Cervo and Lessa 2014, 149).

³⁰ In the original: “o agronegócio e a expansão para fora de empresas brasileiras, isto é, a internacionalização econômica. Na esfera do multilateralismo humanitário e da segurança internacional, princípios e conduta se mantêm” (Cervo and Lessa 2014, 150).

“[t]he crisis of this model occurred from 2013 onwards, during the Dilma Rousseff government, and was consolidated in 2015, with the beginning of the impeachment process and the rise of Michel Temer to the Presidency of Brazil in 2016” (Martins and Nunes 2017, 193, authors’ translation).³¹ In the authors’ view, the causes of the retraction and end of the Logistics Paradigm are more at an international level:

The resurgence of international economic, political and military disputes highlighted the shortcomings of the Brazilian development model adopted until then (Logistics State), mainly in relation to the sustainability of investments in the Defense Industrial Base, which were directly curtailed (Martins and Nunes 2017, 213, authors’ translation).³²

However, Martins and Nunes (2017) compare the situation after 2016 with the diplomatic model of the 1990s, that is, a model of macroeconomic adjustment, international realignment and diplomatic withdrawal. In their words:

In this context, Brazilian foreign policy is experiencing a similar moment to that of the late 1980s and 1990s: a new process of economic opening aimed at compensating for the growing public deficit, and the absence of a strategy to deal with an international environment that is increasingly hostile to the country’s aspirations (Martins and Nunes 2017, 214, authors’ translation).³³

There is certainly a consensus regarding the end of the Logistics Paradigm, but not when it ended. This indecision is symptomatic of the academic debate that has taken place around this moment in the history of Brazilian foreign policy. As previously discussed, the term paradigm for the period 1999–2012 is still very controversial, as it is loaded with Cervo’s guiding idea. Cervo and

31 In the original: “[a] crise deste modelo ocorreu a partir de 2013, já no Governo de Dilma Rousseff, e foi consolidada em 2015, com o início do processo de impeachment e a ascensão de Michel Temer à Presidência do Brasil em 2016” (Martins and Nunes 2017, 193).

32 In the original: “O recrudescimento das disputas econômicas, políticas e militares internacionais explicitaram as carências do modelo de desenvolvimento brasileiro até então adotado (Estado Logístico), principalmente em relação à sustentabilidade dos investimentos na Base Industrial de Defesa, que foram diretamente cerceados” (Martins and Nunes 2017, 213).

33 In the original: “Neste contexto, a Política Externa Brasileira vive um momento semelhante ao do final dos anos 1980 e anos 1990: um novo processo de abertura econômica visando compensar o crescente déficit público, e a ausência de uma estratégia para lidar com um ambiente internacional cada vez mais hostil às pretensões do país” (Martins and Nunes 2017, 214).

Lessa (2014) still use the term paradigm to describe the decline of Brazilian foreign policy, and in using it, Cervo borrows from Thomas Kuhn's (1988) methodology, in which a paradigm surpasses and denies the previous one (Moraes 2019). As also mentioned previously, history occurs simultaneously, with long-term variables coexisting with short-term ones (Braudel 1983). The logistics paradigm, from this perspective, could be a short-term variable inserted in the larger process of the neoliberal paradigm, which may not yet have ended. In this sense, the concept of the logistics paradigm may be undermined, not only by its short duration when compared to other paradigms, but also by the process of erosion that the term has undergone in academic literature, ranging from optimism to skepticism. In Table 1, it is possible to apply Charles Hermann's (1990) methodology of Foreign policy changes to understand the emptying of the logistics paradigm.


Table 1. Levels of Change in foreign policy

Adjustment Changes	Changes occur in the level of effort (greater or lesser) and/or in the scope of recipients (such as refinement in the class of targets). What is done, how it is done, and the purposes for which it is done remain unchanged.
Program Changes	Changes are made in the methods or means by which the goal or problem is addressed. In contrast to adjustment changes, which tend to be quantitative, program changes are qualitative and involve new instruments of statecraft (such as the pursuit of a goal through diplomatic negotiation rather than military force). What is done and how it is done changes, but the purposes for which it is done remain unchanged.
Problem/Goal Changes	The initial problem or goal that the policy addresses is replaced or simply forfeited. In this foreign policy change, the purposes themselves are replaced.
International Orientation Change	The most extreme form of foreign policy change involves the redirection of the actor's entire orientation toward world affairs. In contrast to lesser forms of change that concern the actor's approach to a single issue or specific set of other actors, orientation change involves a basic shift in the actor's international role and activities. Not one policy but many are more or less simultaneously changed.

Source: Jaeger 2016, 48, prepared by the author based on Hermann (1990, 5).

Table 1 highlights that between the Lula and Rousseff administrations, there were adjustments that, by changing the intensity, impacted the conduct of foreign policy and, consequently, the Logistics Paradigm. Intensity, which is a quantitative characteristic, cannot be neglected in the analysis of foreign policy.

Map 1. Destination and Average Annual Travel Times of Brazilian Presidents



Source: Milani et al. (2014).

As shown in Map 1, the destination and average annual travel times of Presidents Itamar Franco and Dilma Rousseff clearly demonstrate how the Logistics Paradigm was tested under Cardoso, deepened under Lula, and withdrawn under Rousseff (Jaeger 2016). From another perspective, Saraiva (2004) showed his enthusiasm for the paradigmatic revolution taking place in Brazil when analyzing the emergence of the logistics paradigm with federalism in Brazil. In his words, “urgent measures are needed to demonstrate the desire to build a new paradigm that better articulates Brazilian federalism with the modernization undertaken by the country’s own politics and foreign trade”

(Saraiva 2004, 157, authors' translation).³⁴ Furthermore, the author is emphatic in announcing that “[a] paradigm shift is necessary. The traditional concept of state sovereignty is being challenged, as it allows for the revitalization of areas that are undeniably linked to interests and cooperation with subnational units” (Saraiva 2004, 137, authors' translation).³⁵

At a time when the Brazilian diplomatic offensive was still underway, Freixo and Ristoff (2012) analyzed the Logistics paradigm as a long-lasting process, capable of generating new research. For the authors, “[...] with the recent end of the Lula government, which contributed to changes in the new international economy and in the structures of global power, a broad space for research on this period has opened up” (Freixo and Ristoff 2012, 30, authors' translation).³⁶

In an interesting contradiction, for Moraes (2019), who already considered the Logistics Paradigm to have ended in 2016, the analytical category of the paradigm represents significant theoretical and scientific value. The author's euphoria regarding the term “Logistics paradigm” does not fade even knowing its short duration:

The Logistics Paradigm seeks to overcome the values of the neoliberal paradigm while restructuring the system of ideas and world perception of the developmentalist paradigm and can therefore be considered a significant theoretical and scientific advance in the community and in the developmentalist reference (Moraes 2019, 136, authors' translation).³⁷

On the other hand, even Silva (2008; 2015), who was optimistic about the diplomacy of the Lula administration, was reticent and skeptical about the concept of paradigm used by Cervo, especially with regard to the dance of paradigms from 1999 to 2002, that is, the test of the Logistics paradigm

34 In the original: “[m]edidas urgentes, a evidenciar a vontade de construção de um novo paradigma que melhor articule o federalismo brasileiro com a modernização empreendida pela própria política e comércio exterior do país, são necessárias” (Saraiva 2004, 157).

35 In the original: “[a] mudança de paradigma se faz necessária. O conceito tradicional de soberania estatal é posto em xeque, ao permitir engendrar a revitalização de áreas incontestavelmente ligadas a interesses e cooperações com as unidades subnacionais” (Saraiva 2004, 137).

36 In the original: “[...] com o término recente do governo Lula, que contribuiu para mudanças na nova economia internacional e nas estruturas de poder mundial, abre-se um amplo espaço de pesquisas sobre esse período” (Freixo and Ristoff 2012, 30).

37 In the original: “O paradigma Logístico procura superar os valores do paradigma neoliberal ao mesmo tempo em que reestrutura o sistema de ideias e percepção de mundo do paradigma desenvolvimentista, podendo, portanto, ser considerado um avanço teórico e científico significativo na comunidade e na referência desenvolvimentista” (Moraes 2019, 136).

during the second term of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. When analyzing the continuity of such a paradigm in the Rousseff government, Jaeger (2016) recognizes its end with a certain skepticism and pessimism. Finally, for Martins and Nunes (2017), pessimism regarding the use of the Logistics Paradigm is underlying not only the recognition of the end of the Logistics State, but also the use of the term Logistics State as more appropriate, disregarding Cervo's term, without denying its important contribution.

5. Conclusion

Amado Cervo is considered one of the leading authors on the analysis of Brazilian foreign policy and the history of IR in Brazil. The impact of his work and commentaries is so strong that he inaugurated one of the most common ways of separating the history of Brazilian diplomacy, that is, into four paradigms that intertwine dialectically with Brazil's economic and social development. This work sought to analyze how the concept of the Logistics Paradigm developed during the period of its implementation, that is, from 1999 to 2012, not restricted to the diplomatic offensive of the Lula da Silva government (2003–2010).

To this end, in its first section, the work reviewed the classical periodization of the history of Brazilian foreign policy in order to demonstrate the method of periodization of Brazilian diplomatic history employed by classical literature (Cervo 2008; Cervo and Bueno 2008) and the method employed by this article. In the second section of the research, the concept of the Logistics Paradigm was presented more specifically, its essay during the end of the Cardoso government and the contemporary interpretations of the concept. Finally, in the last part of the work, the process of decline of the Logistics Paradigm and the general interpretations of this period were investigated, bringing the balance of the impressions of contemporary analysts.

Using the method of bibliographic review and descriptive analysis, the article selected and discussed six works (Freixo and Ristoff 2012; Jaeger 2016; Martins and Nunes 2017; Moraes 2019; Saraiva 2004; Silva 2008) that addressed the Logistics paradigm in different periods of research and analysis to expose the researchers' impressions about the beginning and end of the Brazilian diplomatic offensive and, equally, about their optimism or skepticism regarding the proposition of the new concept.

It is satisfactorily concluded that the hypothesis—that the academic debate on the Logistics Paradigm was influenced by the events of the *diplomatic*

offensive—answered the question of whether such academic debate changed during the 1999–2012 period, given that the hypothesis test, through the aforementioned methodology, was plausible. Furthermore, the objective of this article of analyzing how the concept of the Logistics Paradigm applies to the period 1999–2012 was also fulfilled. Finally, although the academic purpose of this work is justified by the importance of discussing important terms of literature in retrospect, the possibility of this research being susceptible to criticism, contributions, and even overcoming cannot be ruled out.

In order to indicate possible routes for continuing the research outlined above, it is considered that the debate presented here can serve as a basis for analyzing the foreign policy of governments after the period discussed here. In the future, the possibility of new lines of Brazilian foreign policy presenting, or not, characteristics that synthesize previous approaches could be analyzed, possibly analyzing the governments of Michel Temer (2016–2018), Jair Bolsonaro (2019–2022), and the third term of Lula da Silva (2023 onwards). In addition to this possibility, and based on other theoretical tools developed more recently in the field of foreign policy Analysis, one could also correlate the debates on diplomatic bureaucracy, decision-making processes, and studies of cognitive processes with the periodization developed by Cervo. Finally, it is also considered pertinent to bring together constructivist theories of International Relations, especially their focus on the process of constructing identities as a basis for the articulation of external interests, with Cervian paradigms, as a way of explaining short-term fluctuations within the longer horizons of foreign policy paradigms.

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